It seems that many of our attitudes are transparent, in the following sense: we can come to know that we have an attitude M by considering a question about the content of M. This is clearest in the case of belief, as is illustrated by the following oft-quoted passage of Gareth Evans's, ....in making a self-ascription of belief, one's eyes are, so to speak, or occasionally literally, directed outward -upon the world. If someone asks me 'Do you think there is going to be a third world war?', I must attend, in answering him, to precisely the same outward phenomena as I would attend to if I were answering the question 'Will there be a third world war?' (Evans 1982: 225) But it is also true, to varying degrees, of other attitudes as well. As Dorit Bar-On points out, If asked whether I am hoping or wishing that p, whether I prefer x to y, whether I am angry at or afraid of z, and so on, my attention would be directed at p, x and y, z, etc. For example, to say how I feel about an upcoming holiday, I would consider whether the holiday is likely to be fun. Asked whether I find my neighbour annoying, I would ponder her actions and render a verdict. (Bar-On 2004: 106) This remarkable fact -that we appear to be able to answer questions directed at one subject matter by considering questions directed at another -has played a leading role in several recent accounts of self-knowledge. Thus Richard Moran claims (2001: 150) that
knowledge of our intentions still has ramifications for the account of our knowledge of our beliefs, given the prima facie desirability of having an account of self-knowledge which is at least to some extent unified.
The Interpretation of Transparency
So far we have characterized transparency vaguely, in terms of the capacity to answer a question about whether or not one has some particular attitude by consideration of a question about its content. We now need to be a little more specific about what this amounts to. In particular I want to make explicit three assumptions about transparency that the worry I raise will rely on.
First, transparency is supposed to be a way of gaining knowledge about one's attitudes.
The idea is that we can make knowledgeable judgments about a state of mind by answering a question about its content. It is hard to see how one could deny this if one sees transparency as being in whatever way central to self-knowledge.
Second, to say that we answer one question by answering another is to say that the answer we give to the latter question determines the answer we give to the former. Thus when I ask myself whether I believe that p, I answer by answering the question of whether p in the sense that my answer to the latter question determines my answer to the former question. If I answer whether p in the affirmative then my answer to whether I believe that p is also in the affirmative, and if my answer to whether p is either no or I don't know, then my answer to whether I believe that p is that I don't. After all, it is clearly not the case that one can answer the question of whether one intends p (let alone whether one hopes, or fears, that p) by answering the question of whether p.
To mention just one difficulty, it is possible to foresee that one will do something without intending to do it. Thus if one did try to answer questions about one's own intentions in this way, one could easily be led to mistaken conclusions. 
Transparency, Akrasia and Uniqueness
The understanding of transparency given above makes it reasonably clear how it is that we could come to know that we have some mental state by considering the content of that state. The basic procedure is that we ask ourselves whether to have attitude M, and if we conclude that M is the attitude to have, we judge that we have it, and if we conclude that it's not, we judge that we don't.
There is an obvious objection to this idea: agents don't always have the attitudes that they judge are the attitudes to have. I can intend to have another drink, while knowing full well that this is not the thing to be doing. Thus it seems that coming to judgments about our attitudes by reflection on what attitudes to have will lead us astray in such cases. And the possibility of such attitudes places Moran's claim that transparency is central to selfknowledge, and the key to understanding immediacy and authority, in doubt. For after all, can I not know -in the ordinary, first-person way -that I intend to have another drink, even though this attitude is not transparent?
Moran's response to this objection is to deny that we 'speak with first-person authority' about our akratic attitudes (2001: 128) . 5 An exploration of his discussion and defence of this claim would lead us too far astray and, I shall argue, would anyway be redundant.
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This is because there are rational attitudes -which can be recognized as such by their agents -which are just as resistant to transparency, and yet which can uncontroversially be the objects of ordinary self-knowledge. By focussing on these examples we can generate just the same problems for Moran, while sparing ourselves the need to resolve the considerable complexities involved in trying to understand akrasia. I can start to explain this by pointing out a crucial assumption of the transparency procedure. he ought to take the 101, nor that he ought to take the 208, nor that he ought to take both.
Thus we can generate counter-examples to transparency.
Suppose that Bratman decides to take the 101, and thus that he intends to do so. This intention may be one over which he exhibits paradigmatic self-knowledge -his knowledge of his intention will be both immediate and authoritative -but it will not be transparent. He cannot answer the question of whether he intends to take the 101 by considering the question of whether to take the 101. As he recognizes, the reasons bearing on the question of whether to take the 101 do not determine that taking the 101 is the thing to do -he could just as well take the 208. Thus any answer he gives to the question of whether to take the 208 he can equally give to the question of whether to take the 101. So he cannot know whether he intends to take the 101 by considering the question of whether to take the 101.
Cases with this kind of structure are pervasive in the practical realm. 8 The example of choices between equally good options is just one kind of example. Other clear examples are cases of choice between incommensurable options, and choice when one is ignorant 8 As Joseph Raz (1999: 100) puts it, 'most of the time people have a variety of options such that it would accord with reason for them to choose any one of them and it would not be against reason to avoid any of them'.
or uncertain of what can be said in favour of one's options. More controversial examples include: deciding to do something 'for no reason'; deciding to φ on the grounds that φing is in the relevant respect good enough, even though ψing would be in that respect better;
deciding what to do in a case where one of one's options is supererogatory. In each of these cases an agent will be able to form a rational intention, over which he exhibits paradigmatic self-knowledge, but, as he will not affirm that his intention is the attitude to have, it will not be transparent.
Cases with this structure are more difficult to generate in the theoretical realm, and thus uniqueness is more controversial for belief than intention. Consider what seems to be the most straightforward parallel to Bratman's case, a case where one has equal reason to believe two inconsistent propositions. For example, I have equal reason to believe that there are even number of students on campus right now, and that there are an odd number of students on campus right now. Yet, in contrast to the intention case, it is not rational for me to believe either of these propositions. The rational thing to do is to suspend judgment. Thus I can answer the question of whether I believe that there are an odd number of students on campus right now -I consider whether or not there are, realize that I ought not to believe that there are, and thus judge that I don't believe that there are.
So we have no quick and easy counter-example to transparency.
Nonetheless the claim that there is always a uniquely correct attitude to take towards p, when one is considering whether p, remains a strikingly strong claim. It is far from obvious why there cannot be evidential states good enough to permit believe in p, without requiring belief in p, and thereby also permitting suspension of belief in p. And indeed, many philosophical theories of rational or justified beliefs make room for this. Thus, according to coherentists, a belief is justified just in case it is part of a network of mutually coherent beliefs. But as coherence may be achieved in different ways, this leaves open the possibility that both belief in p, and suspension of judgment in p, will make for similar degrees of coherence. And according to proponents of conservatism, a belief is justified unless one has reason to abandon it. Again, this allows that both belief in p, and suspension of belief in p, may be acceptable given one's evidence.
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Thus it seems that the defender of the transparency-based approach to self-knowledge is committed to a thesis which seems clearly false of intentions, and is controversial for belief. Moreover even if he is willing to accept, and defend, uniqueness for beliefs, it is hard to see how he could do this for intentions. Thus he has real difficulties in generalizing his account beyond (one aspect) of the cognitive realm.
Another Interpretation of Transparency?
Faced with this objection a defender of the centrality of transparency may well be tempted to reject my interpretation of that claim. But it is hard to see how else to understand transparency, if it is to yield the result that answering a content-directed question is a way of coming to know one's own mind. As the kind of cases discussed above show, for example, it would be no good to say that attitudes need only be transparent to the question of whether there is reason to have them, or even sufficient reason to have them.
